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STOLEN VALOR: LIES, DECEPTION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
 
EDWARD J. SCHOEN* 





In United States v. Alvarez,1 the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the 
Stolen Valor Act of 2005, which makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of 
military medals or decorations2 and provides an enhanced penalty for 
offenses involving the Congressional Medal of Honor,3 was unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment. Xavier Alvarez, attending his first public 
meeting as a member of the Three Valley Water District Board, a 
government entity headquartered in Claremont, California, introduced 
himself as a “retired marine of 25 years” who had been awarded the 
Congressional Medal of Honor.4 Because those statements were false, 
Alvarez was indicted under the Stolen Valor Act for lying about the 
Congressional Medal of Honor. The Federal District Court rejected his 
argument the statute violated the First Amendment, and Alvarez pleaded 
guilty to one count, reserving his right to appeal his First Amendment claim.5 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the Stolen Valor Act was 
                                                 
* J.D., Professor of Management, Rohrer College of Business, Rowan University, Glassboro, 
New Jersey. 
** J.D. Joseph S. Falchek recently retired as Professor of Business Administration and 
Chairperson of Business Administration and Management Department, McGowan School of 
Business, King’s College, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, and he now practices law in Plains, 
Pennsylvania. 
1 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
2 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2012) (“Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in 
writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed 
Forces of the United States, any of the service medals or badges awarded to the members of 
such forces, the ribbon, button, or rosette of any such badge, decoration, or medal, or any 
colorable imitation of such item shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six 
months, or both.”).  
3 18 U.S.C. § 704(c) (2012) (“If a decoration or medal involved in an offense under subsection 
(a) or (b) is a Congressional Medal of Honor, in lieu of the punishment provided in that 
subsection, the offender shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or 
both.”). 
4 U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012). 
5 Id.  
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unconstitutional under the First Amendment and reversed Alvarez’s 
conviction,6 and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.7 
The U.S. Supreme Court in a plurality opinion8 ruled that the Stolen 
Valor Act was a content-based restriction on speech and therefore 
presumably invalid and that the government had the burden of showing its 
constitutionality.9 While the plurality opinion agreed that the Stolen Valor 
Act supported a compelling government interest of maintaining the integrity 
of the military honors system,10 the plurality opinion, applying the exacting 
scrutiny standard, held that the government failed to meet its “heavy burden” 
of demonstrating the restriction actually advances the government interest 
and does so in the least restrictive manner,11 and therefore decided that the 
Stolen Valor Act was unconstitutional.12 The concurring opinion opted to 
apply intermediate scrutiny,13 determined the Stolen Valor law lacked 
“limiting features” to reduce the risk of chilling valuable speech, posed a 
significant risk of First Amendment harm, 14 and could achieve its objective 
in a more reasonably tailored manner.15 Hence, the concurring opinion 
concluded that the Stolen Valor law “works disproportionate constitutional 
                                                 
6 Id. See U.S. v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1218 (9th Cir. 2010). 
7 U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). After certiorari was granted, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that the Stolen Valor Act was constitutional, U.S. v. 
Strandlof, 667 F.3d 1146, 1169 (10th Cir. 2012), adopting many of the arguments advanced by 
the Government in Alvarez and creating a conflict in the Court of Appeals on the question of 
the Act’s validity. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542. 
8 The plurality opinion was authored by Justice Kennedy in which Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542. Justices Breyer wrote a 
concurring opinion in which Justice Kagan joined. Id. at 2551. Justice Alito wrote a dissenting 
opinion in which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined. Id. at 2556. In his dissent, Justice Alito 
took the position that the Stolen Valor law was a narrow statute prohibiting only knowingly 
false statements about facts within the personal speaker’s knowledge, that, because such lies 
have no value, proscribing them does not violate the First Amendment, and that the Alvarez 
decision breaks sharply with a long line of cases indicating protected speech does not include 
false statements, which inflict real harm and serve no legitimate interest. Id. at 2557, 2560-61. 
See Bernard J. Pazanowski, Splintered Supreme Court Shoots Down Stolen Valor Act Under 
First Amendment, 81 U.S.L.W. 9, 11 (2012).  
9 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544, citing Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 
660 (2004) (declaring the Child Online Protection Act to be a content-based restriction on 
speech and determining that the government did not meet its burden of demonstrating less 
pervasive means such as filtering software failed achieve the government objective of 
protecting minors from sexually explicit materials on the internet). 
10 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549-50. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 2551. 
13 Id. at 2552. 
14 Id. at 2555. 
15 Id. at 2556. 
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harm” in achieving its objective, flunks the intermediate scrutiny test, and 
violates the First Amendment.16  
The crux of the government’s position supporting the constitutionality 
of the Stolen Valor Act is that false speech contributes little value to society 
and lacks First Amendment protection. The plurality and concurring opinions 
reconciled conflicting language in its prior decisions regarding First 
Amendment protection of false speech, declined to create a new category of 
speech unprotected by the First Amendment, and ultimately concluded that 
some false statements may be entitled to First Amendment protection. In 
doing so, the court “made clear that there is generally a First Amendment 
right to lie” and “speech cannot be punished just because it is false.”17 
The Alvarez decision is an important First Amendment case, because it 
captures the categories of speech that remain outside the ambit of First 
Amendment protection, addresses inconsistent prior opinions dealing with 
First Amendment protection of false speech, declines to add false speech to 
those categories of speech lacking First Amendment protection, and permits 
the First Amendment to protect false speech. 
 
II. CATEGORIES OF SPEECH LACKING FIRST AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION 
 
The plurality opinion in Alvarez acknowledges that there are “historic 
and traditional categories” of expression not entitled to First Amendment 
protection for which content based restrictions have been permitted, but notes 
that they “are confined to the few ‘historic and traditional categories [of 
expression] long familiar to the bar.’”18 They are: (1) advocacy to incite and 
likely to incite imminent lawless action19; (2) obscenity20; (3) defamation of 
ordinary folks21; (4) speech integral to criminal conduct22; (5) fighting 
                                                 
16 Id.  
17 Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment and the Right to Lie, ABA JOURNAL LAW NEWS 
NOW (September 5, 2012), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/the_first_amendment_and_the_right_to_lie/?utm_sou
rce=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email.  
18 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544.  
19 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (statute which purports to punish mere 
advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to 
advocate the described type of action violates the First Amendment).  
20 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957) (obscenity is not protected speech), and 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973) (obscene material is not protected by the First 
Amendment). 
21 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (public officials cannot 
recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct unless they prove that 
the statement was made with actual malice), and Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 
347 (1974), deciding that newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about 
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words23; (6) child pornography24; (7) fraud25; (8) threats to kill or inflict 
injury on the President of the United States26; and (9) speech creating grave 
and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent.27 Notably, the 
plurality opinion emphasized, the nine categories of speech permitting 
content-based regulation do not and should not include false statements, 
because false statements “are inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous 
expression of views in public and private conversation, expression the First 
Amendment seeks to guarantee.”28 Further, while the plurality opinion 
acknowledges some categories of speech that are historically unprotected by 
the first amendment may not yet have been identified in case law,29 the Court 
                                                                                                                   
an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional 
privilege against liability for injury inflicted. “[S]o long as they do not impose liability without 
fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher 
or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.” Id. 
22 Gibony v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 504 (1949) (state’s power to regulate 
and govern how trade practices are carried out trumps the speech rights of the workers). In 
Gibony, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Missouri statute prohibiting labor union members 
from picketing business premises for the purpose of preventing sales to nonunion members 
and thereby forcing them to join the union. The Court ruled the picketing could be enjoined 
under Missouri’s anti-trade law, because the union members’ exercise of speech was an illegal 
restraint of trade under Missouri’s law.  
23 Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (“the insulting or 
‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace [are] of slight social value” and are not entitled to First 
Amendment protection).  
24 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (child pornography, like obscenity, is 
unprotected by the First Amendment).  
25 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) 
(“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.”); 
see also Illinois ex. rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 623-24 
(2003), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled states may pursue fraud actions against 
deliberate misrepresentations designed to deceive potential donors during the solicitation 
process about how their donations will be used.  
26 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam opinion upholding 
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) making it a felony to threaten the life of the President, 
President-elect, Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of 
President or Vice President). 
27 Near v. Minnesota ex. rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (prior restraints may be 
employed by the government in exceptional cases such as when a nation is at war and the 
utterance hinders its war effort or threatens its troops). Near has been substantially curtailed 
by New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curium) (“Any 
system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption 
against its constitutional validity.”). 
28 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544. 
29 Id. at 2547, citing U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (“Maybe there are some 
categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically 
identified or discussed as such in our case law. But if so, there is no evidence that ‘depictions 
of animal cruelty’ is among them.”) In Stevens, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a state 
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should not do so in the absence of “persuasive evidence that a novel 
restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition 
of proscription.” 30 Because the government did not meet that burden, the 
plurality opinion declined to recognize false statements as a new category of 
unprotected speech.  
While acknowledging the existence of language in some of the Court’s 
precedents stating false statements have no value and lack First Amendment 
protection,31 the plurality opinion maintains those statements are taken out of 
their proper context and do not support the proposition that false statements 
are beyond constitutional protection.32 Rather, the plurality opinion stresses, 
the Court never endorsed or confronted the categorical rule advanced by the 
Government: that false statements receive no First Amendment protection.”33 
The concurring opinion agreed, stating language in prior decisions saying or 
implying false statements enjoy little First Amendment protection “cannot be 
read to mean ‘no protection at all.’”34 
Both the plurality and concurring opinions acknowledge the existence of 
criminal prohibitions against making false statements to a Government 
official, perjury, false representations that one is acting as a government 
official, false claims of terrorist attacks, lies about the commission of crimes 
                                                                                                                   
statute prohibiting depictions of animal cruelty violated the First Amendment because it was 
overbroad. Id. at 482. 
30 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2547, citing Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Assn., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 
(2011) (overturning a California statute restricting sales and requiring the labeling of violent 
video games as impermissibly creating a category of unprotected speech without persuasive 
evidence the content restriction was part of a long tradition of proscription). 
31 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545. See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 
(1988) (“False statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-
seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual's 
reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective.); 
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60(1982) (“[D]emonstrable falsehoods are not protected by 
the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements.”); Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 771 (“Nor is there any claim that prescription 
drug price advertisements are forbidden because they are false or misleading in any way. 
Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.”); 
Gertz v. Welsh, 418 U.S. at 339 (“[Intentional lies and careless errors] belong to that category 
of utterances which ‘are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 
171 (1979) (“Spreading false information in and of itself carries no First Amendment 
credentials.”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (“[T]he knowingly false 
statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy 
constitutional protection.”). 
32 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545.  
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 2553. 
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or catastrophes, and trademark infringements,35 and the concurring opinion 
acknowledges the existence of statutes and common-law doctrines making 
false statements unlawful, such as fraud, defamation, and false light invasion 
of privacy.36 Those prohibitions on false statements, however, are 
inapplicable to the recognition of a category of unprotected speech, just as 
the Court’s decision in Alvarez does not support a challenge to the 
constitutionality of those prohibitions.37 Further, as Justice Breyer notes in 
his concurring opinion, those statutes include “limitations of context” and 
“proof of injury” that narrow their reach and “help make certain that the 
statute does not allow its threat of liability or criminal punishment to roam at 
large” prohibiting the telling of lies in family and social settings where harm 
is unlikely and the need is small.38  
 
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STOLEN VALOR ACT 
 
Having determined that deceptive statements do not and should not 
constitute a category of speech not entitled to First Amendment protection, 
the plurality and concurring opinion proceeded to determine whether or not 
the Stolen Valor Act passed muster under the First Amendment. As noted 
above, the plurality opinion utilized strict scrutiny and the concurring opinion 
applied intermediate scrutiny to resolve the issue.  
 
A. Plurality Opinion and Strict Scrutiny 
 
The plurality opinion initiated its discussion of the constitutionality of 
the Stolen Valor Act by noting the importance of military medals in 
recognizing and expressing gratitude for acts of heroism and fostering morale 
and esprit de corps within the military, and the importance of maintaining 
integrity of the military honors system in supporting those compelling 
interests.39 The plurality opinion determined, however, there was no causal 
link “between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented,” 
because the Government failed to provide evidence the public’s perception of 
military awards is diluted by false claims such as those made by Alvarez, and 
                                                 
35 Id. at 2545, 2554. 
36 Id. at 2555. 
37 Id. at 2547 (“This opinion does not imply that any of these targeted prohibitions are 
somehow vulnerable.”); see Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A 
Central, Complex and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 U.C.L.A. L.R. 1107, 1108 (2006) 
(“In many circumstances the First Amendment is no bar to government measures condemning 
deceptions by statement or concealment, whether government or private parties are the 
deceivers or the deceived.”). 
38 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2555. See Pazanowski, supra note 8, at 11.  
39 Id. at 2548. 
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did not show why counterspeech was insufficient to achieve its interest.40 
Following his lie at the public meeting, Alvarez “was perceived as a phony,” 
“ridiculed online,” and asked to resign from the board.41 Such public reaction 
to Alvarez’s lies serves “to reawaken and reinforce the public’s respect for 
the Medal, its recipients, and its high purpose,”42 and “there is good reason to 
believe that a similar fate would befall other false claimants.43 Further, the 
plurality opinion determined that there was one less speech restrictive means 
to attain its objective, namely creating a database accessible through the 
internet listing the recipients of military honors and medals to verify and 
expose false claims to military honors.44 Hence, Alvarez’s false statements, 
while contemptible, were protected by the First Amendment.45 
 
B. Concurring Opinion and Intermediate Scrutiny 
 
The concurring opinion initiated its analysis by expressing wariness 
about applying the strict scrutiny test to statutes that adversely affect 
constitutionally protected rights, because strict scrutiny, as its name implies, 
invariably results in “near automatic condemnation,” just as the rational basis 
test results in “near automatic approval.”46 Because statutes like the Stolen 
Valor Act restrain communication of false statements, which are “less likely 
                                                 
40 Id. at 2549.  
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 2549-50. 
43 Id. at 2550-51. 
44 Id. at 2551. The federal government launched a new website on which it publishes 
information about those who were awarded the two highest awards for valor, Medals of Honor 
and Service Crosses since September 11, 2011. Jake Tapper, Fighting ‘Stolen Valor,’ 
President Obama Announces New Website to Combat Those Falsely Claiming Military 
Medals, ABC NEWS (July 23, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/07/fighting-
stolen-valor-president-obama-announces-new-website-to-combat-those-falsely-claiming-
military-medals/. 
45 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551. 
46 Id. at 2552. Justice Breyer presaged his uneasiness with the strict scrutiny and rational basis 
tests in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 
353 (2009), in which the majority opinion decided Idaho’s ban on public employee payroll 
deductions for political activities did not restrict public employees right to engage in speech 
and passed constitutional muster under the rational basis test. Justice Breyer agreed with the 
majority opinion’s view that strict scrutiny did not apply, but disagreed with the majority’s 
view that no First Amendment interest was at stake. Rather, Justice Breyer maintained, the 
refusal to permit payroll deductions for political activities restricted a channel through which 
financial support for speech might flow. That restriction, Justice Breyer insisted, should be 
viewed under the intermediate scrutiny test, which evaluates the proportionality of the 
restriction on the First Amendment right and the interest the government seeks to achieve. In 
doing so, he characterized the strict scrutiny test as almost always proving fatal to the law in 
question and the rational basis test as almost always resulting approval of the restriction. Id. at 
367. 
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than are true factual statements to make a valuable contribution to the 
marketplace of ideas,” and the government has good reasons to proscribe 
such speech even at the cost of some speech related harms, the concurring 
opinion opted to apply the intermediate scrutiny test as a better gauge to 
balance the benefits and harms triggered by the statute.47 
While recognizing the Stolen Valor Act has substantial justification in 
protecting the honor of those awarded military recognition and preserving the 
value of those awards, Justices Breyer and Kagan were troubled by the 
breadth of the Act: 
 
As written, it applies in family, social, or other private contexts, 
where lies will often cause little harm. It also applies in political 
contexts, where although such lies are more likely to cause harm, 
the risk of censorious selectivity by prosecutors is also high. 
Further, given the potential haziness of individual memory along 
with the large number of military awards covered (ranging from 
medals for rifle marksmanship to the Congressional Medal of 
Honor), there remains a risk of chilling that is not completely 
eliminated by mens rea requirements; a speaker might still be 
worried about being prosecuted for a careless false statement, even 
if he does not have the intent required to render him liable. And so 
the prohibition may be applied where it should not be applied, for 
example, to bar stool braggadocio or, in the political arena, subtly 
but selectively to speakers that the Government does not like. 
These considerations lead me to believe that the statute as written 
risks significant First Amendment harm.48 
 
Moreover, the concurring opinion determined that the government could 
achieve its objective in a far less burdensome manner by a “more finely 
tailored statute,” which, for example, did not treat all military awards alike or 
required a demonstration of a specific harm.49 Because the Government 
failed to provide “a convincing explanation as to why a more finely tailored 
statute would not work” and because the Stolen Valor Act could achieve its 
objective with significantly less damage to First Amendment protections, the 
concurring opinion concluded the statute “works disproportionate 
                                                 
47 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2552. 
48 Id. at 2555 (emphasis in original). 
49 Id. at 2556. A revised version of the Stolen Valor Law, limiting punishment to lying about 
decorations and medals for “tangible benefit or personal gain,” passed the Senate on 
December 3, 2012. A different version previously passed in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, and the two bills must now be reconciled. Bryant Jordan, Stolen Valor Law 
2.0 Passes in Senate, MILITARY.COM NEWS (December 4, 2012), 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/12/04/stolen-valor-law-20-passes-in-senate.html.  
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constitutional harm,” fails the intermediate scrutiny test, and violates the 
First Amendment.50 
 
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF ALVAREZ 
 
The Alvarez decision is important in a number of respects. First, while it 
does not break new ground, the decision reinforces the Court’s prior ruling in 
Snyder v. Phelps,51 decided in the previous term, that unpopular and even 
repugnant speech a can be protected by the First Amendment.52 Second, the 
decision brings some clarity to the conflicting statements in prior U.S. 
Supreme Court opinions as to whether false speech can be protected under 
the First Amendment. Alvarez makes clear that “speech cannot be punished 
just because it is false.”53 Third, the Court declined the invitation to create a 
tenth category of speech that is not protected by the First Amendment and 
limited future attempts to do so unless there is persuasive evidence that such 
an exception is part of a long-standing tradition. Finally, the U.S. Supreme 
Court resisted the invitation to use the myriad statutes and regulations 
prohibiting lies and deceptions as justification for denying First Amendment 
protection to untruthful speech.54  
                                                 
50 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2556. 
51 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). In Snyder, protesters simultaneously delivered their message that 
God is offended by, and punishes the United States for its tolerance of, homosexuality, 
particularly in the military, and that God kills soldiers as retribution for that tolerance during 
the funeral of person who died in military service. 
52 Chemerinsky, supra note 17. 
53 Id; see Pazanowski, supra note 8, at 10. 
54 As eloquently stated by one commentator: 
  
We live in a world filled with deception. We frequently observe or experience 
deception in politics, business, religion, education, our personal lives, and virtually 
every other realm of human existence. Human deceptions run the gamut from the 
seemingly benign practice of convincing children of the existence of Santa Claus, 
or of lying to make a surprise birthday party successful, to malicious assertions 
falsely denying that the Holocaust occurred; from intentionally concealing one’s 
identity in order to conduct undercover operations, maintain privacy, ward off 
retaliation for unpopular belief, or disguise who is really funding a candidate or a 
ballot measure, to fraudulent statements designed to cheat others of their money or 
goods; from deceptive commercial advertising in order to promote demand, to 
deceptive political statements aimed at gaining or exercising government power; 
from historical fiction like The Da Vinci Code that may mislead its readers about 
the history of the Roman Catholic Church, to filing a false report about police or 
prison guard misconduct. 
Almost as pervasive and varied as deception itself are government efforts to 
control deception in the interest of protecting from serious harm our people, our 
institutions, and our very form of self-governing representative democracy. 
Deception may mislead consumers to financial or medical ruin. It may ravage 
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Following Alvarez, the starting point in determining whether a lie is 
protected by the First Amendment is to assume that lies are safequarded by 
the First Amendment at least to some extent.55 How much protection is 
accorded depends on the approach taken. According to the plurality opinion, 
if the speech regulation is content-based, strict scrutiny will be applied unless 
the speech fits into one of the previously carved out categories of speech.” 
According to the concurring opinion, there is no pre-commitment to 
protected speech and a sliding scale is employed in looking at the protection 
given to the speech. According to the dissent, speech must have some value 
before the First Amendment applies.56  
 
 
                                                                                                                   
reputations. It may distort politics and undermine the proper functioning of our 
representative democracy. It may threaten corruption of our government and the 
effective functioning of our economy. No wonder our laws contain so many 
restrictions on false, deceptive, and misleading communications. Imposing 
sanctions for perjury, false statements under oath, fraud, defamation, deceptive 
commercial or political advertising, false statements and omissions of material 
facts in stock offerings or corporate performance generally, withholding or 
concealing information about financial or other support for causes or candidates, 
and the like, is almost inevitably the product of a natural and legitimate impulse on 
the part of government to control the various and significant kinds of havoc that 
deceptive communications otherwise might wreak.  
 
Varat, supra note 37, at 1108-09. 
55 Pazanowski, supra note 8, at 11. . Because all lies are presumably protected by the First 
Amendment, Alvarez may be applied to cases in which courts are asked to remove defamatory 
posts from internet blogs. Id. at 9. Alverez also throws into question the laws of twenty states 
barring false or misleading statements in political campaigns. Debra Cassens Weiss, The Mud 
Is Flung Despite State Laws Barring Political Lies; Does First Amendment Offer Protection?, 




56 Pazanowski, supra note 8, at 11.  
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